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The	US	should	not	roll	back	financial	regulation
In	the	United	States,	the	House	of	Representatives	has	passed	the	Financial	CHOICE	Act	(Creating	Hope	and
Opportunity	for	Investors,	Consumers	and	Entrepreneurs	Act).	This	bill	is	intended	to	replace	the	financial	market
regulation	of	the	Obama	era,	the	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act,	which	was	a
response	to	the	global	financial	market	crisis	of	2008.
One	of	the	cornerstones	of	Dodd-Frank	was	the	macroprudential	view,	i.e.	the	system-wide	view	on	financial
markets.	It	addresses	the	interconnections	of	market	participants,	the	possibility	of	herding	behaviour	and	the
build-up	of	credit	and	asset	price	bubbles.	In	contrast	to	this,	the	Financial	CHOICE	Act	goes	back	to	the
microprudential	view,	i.e.	its	focus	is	on	the	risks	of	isolated	financial	institutions.
The	disadvantages	of	the	Financial	CHOICE	Act	over	Dodd-Frank	can	be	seen	from	the	following	examples:
Regulatory	relief	for	well-capitalised	banks
The	Financial	CHOICE	Act	allows	banks	with	an	unweighted	equity-capital	ratio	(leverage	ratio)	of	more	than	10
per	cent	to	switch	to	a	less	stringent	regulatory	framework	than	Basel	III,	which	the	act	calls	capital	election.	An
equity	capital	ratio	of	more	than	10	per	cent	appears	to	be	high	from	a	European	perspective.	However,	it	must
be	taken	into	account	that	the	balance	sheets	of	US	banks	are	smaller	than	the	balance	sheets	of	comparable
European	banks	due	to	different	accounting	rules.	The	capital	election	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	highly
capitalized	banks	should	be	able	to	cover	their	losses	without	the	intervention	of	supervisory	authorities.
This	approach	neglects	the	effects	of	herding	behaviour	on	the	financial	system’s	stability	as	well	as	the
possibility	of	concentration	risks	in	banks’	balance	sheets.	Basel	III	addresses	these	risks	with	instruments	such
as	the	anti-cyclical	capital	buffer	and	the	sectoral	risk	weights.
Bank	resolution	through	the	bankruptcy	code
The	Financial	CHOICE	Act	will	abate	the	Orderly	Liquidation	Authority	(OLA).	Instead,	banks	in	a	state	of
emergency	should	be	resolved	via	the	Bankruptcy	Code.	The	OLA	was	established	on	the	basis	of	the
experience	of	the	global	financial	market	crisis	when	it	proved	almost	impossible	to	resolve	large	investment
banks	through	the	normal	insolvency	framework.
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In	a	normal	insolvency	proceeding,	the	creditors	decide	in	a	judicially	monitored	process	on	the	recovery	of
assets.	Any	necessary	pre-financing	of	resolution	measures	is	made	through	the	sale	of	assets	of	the	failed
company.
The	bankruptcy	code	might	be	suitable	for	the	resolution	of	smaller	banks,	but	it	is	not	suitable	for	the	resolution
of	larger	investment	banks.	In	the	case	of	the	failure	of	a	large	investment	bank,	repercussions	and	contagion
effects	on	the	financial	system	must	be	expected.	These	negative	effects	result	on	the	one	hand	from	the	very
short	maturities	of	the	liabilities	of	an	investment	bank,	so	that	the	freezing	of	these	liabilities	can	cause	liquidity
shortages	among	the	creditors	and	cause	disruptions	in	the	entire	payment	system.	On	the	other	hand,	negative
effects	result	from	the	sale	of	assets	on	a	large	scale,	which	causes	price	pressure	on	comparable	assets	that
cause	mark-to-market	losses	for	other	banks.
It	is	therefore	damaging	to	the	financial	system	to	bring	the	so-called	system-relevant	functions	of	a	large	bank	in
an	insolvency	process	to	a	halt.	Instead,	these	critical	functions	must	be	stabilized	in	an	orderly	process	over	a
long	period	of	time.	This	is	why	the	OLA	is	set	up.
The	abatement	of	the	OLA	by	the	Financial	CHOICE	Act	carries	the	risk	that,	as	in	the	case	of	Lehman	Brothers,
the	unordered	insolvency	of	an	investment	bank	can	lead	the	financial	system	to	collapse.	This	would	also	lead	to
a	loss	of	European	banks	through	the	global	interconnections	of	the	banks.
Abatement	of	the	Volcker	rule
The	Financial	CHOICE	Act	will	abolish	the	Volcker	rule,	which	restricts	the	financing	of	proprietary	trading	with
insured	deposits	and	for	banks	with	access	to	the	Federal	Reserve’s	discount	window.
The	Volcker	rule	can	be	seen	very	critically.	On	the	one	hand,	the	banks’	proprietary	trading	is	not	exactly
distinguishable	from	trading	on	behalf	of	customers.	This	would	be	the	case	if,	in	preparation	for	a	customer	order
to	hedge	price	fluctuations,	a	bank	initially	acts	on	its	own	account.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Volcker	rule	does	not
distinguish	between	proprietary	trading	and	market-making	activities.
Through	the	abatement	of	the	Volcker	rule	there	is	the	risk	that	trading	from	the	EU	could	shift	to	the	then
possibly	less	regulated	US.
Reducing	consumer	protection
The	Financial	CHOICE	Act	abates	the	Fiduciary	Rule,	which	obliges	providers	of	pension	products	to	work	in	the
best	interest	of	the	customer.	The	Fiduciary	Rule	is	not	part	of	Dodd-Frank,	but	it	was	decided	at	the	same	time.
In	addition,	the	Financial	CHOICE	Act	will	limit	the	independence	of	the	Consumer	Financial	Protection	Bureau
(CFPB),	which	will	be	restructured.	The	CFPB	will	be	prohibited	to	publish	any	consumer	complaints	about
financial	products	or	the	suppliers	of	these	products.
Although	the	reduction	of	consumer	protection	can	improve	household	access	to	financial	products,	it	must	also
be	taken	into	account	that,	in	the	pre-crisis	period,	the	lack	of	consumer	protection	in	the	US	stimulated	the
lending	to	households	with	low	credit	ratings,	which	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	the	US	real	estate	bubble.
The	Financial	CHOICE	Act	lacks	system	view
The	Financial	CHOICE	Act	may	be	conclusive	in	some	respects	from	the	micro-prudential	point	of	view.	However,
it	neglects	the	macroprudential	view.	Even	though	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	was	not	perfect	in	all	respects,	it
represents	a	framework	that	can	mitigate	systemic	risks.
The	fact	that	financial	market	regulation	is	adjusted	from	time	to	time	is	normal.	Some	regulations	are	no	longer
up-to-date	because	they	are	based	on	obsolete	technical	standards	or	because	they	are	too	loosely	or	too	strictly
defined.	Instead	of	rolling	back	Dodd-Frank,	Democrats	and	Republicans	would	have	better	strived	for	improving
the	disadvantages	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	without	sacrificing	its	advantages	over	the	pre-crisis	regulatory
framework.
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Notes:
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	author,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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